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Abstract
Along with the oil price, concerns about the security of energy supply have
soared once again in recent years.Yet,more than 30 years after the OPEC oil
embargo in 1973, energy security still remains a diffuse concept. This paper
conceives a statistical indicator that aims at characterizing the energy supply
risk of nations that are heavily dependent on energy imports. Our indicator
condensesthebulkofempiricalinformationontheimportsoffossilfuelsorig-
inating from a multitude of export countries as well as data on the indigenous
contribution to the domestic energy supply into a single parameter.Applying
the proposed concept to empirical energy data on Germany and the U.S.
(1980–2004), we find that there is a large gap in the energy supply risks be-
tween both countries, with Germany suffering much more from a tensed
energy supply situation today than the U.S.
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The security of energy supply has again become a similarly hot topic as it was during
the oil crises in the 1970s. Apparently, the urgency of this issue rises and falls with the
price of oil. In recent years, the oil price has reached new historical peaks, being the
result of a less palatable buffet of geopolitical conﬂicts, violent weather conditions, and
other disruptive factors on the one hand and a demand increase pushed by a strong
global economic development on the other. The conﬂuence of continuing instability in
the Middle East and a surge of oil demand in transition and development countries,
particularly of China, has made energy supply security a high policy priority in both
the European Union and the U.S. Fears about future energy supply are additionally
supported by considerations on the establishment of a cartel of gas exporting countries
akin to the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Yet, more than 30 years after the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, energy security still
remains a diffuse concept (CHALKER 2006:119). There appears to be neither a clear and
unique deﬁnition nor a widely accepted statistical measure that captures the notion
of energy security. This deﬁcit seems to be all the more surprising as resource econo-
mics has a long tradition that is based on the classical contributions by JEVONS (1865),
GRAY (1914), and HOTELLING (1931). Partly, this may be the result of the difﬁculty to
incorporate diverse resource economic aspects, such as absolute and relative scarcity,
into a single indicator. While the notion of absolute scarcity focuses on the potential
exhaustion of resources such as oil or gas, the aspect of relative scarcity captures transi-
ent resource shortages, for instance due to missing supply capacities. Without such an
indicator, however, any objective judgement on the security of raw materials supply is
hardly possible.
Taking on the perspective of nations that are heavily dependent on energy im-
ports, such as the U.S. and Germany, this paper conceives an energy supply risk indi-
cator that focuses on the aspect of relative scarcity and allows for cross-country and
inter-temporal comparisons of the energy security situation of import countries as well
as counterfactual analyses of alternative policy scenarios (FRONDEL,S CHMIDT 2006).
4Our focus on the aspect of relative, rather than absolute scarcity is due to the fact that
the eventual exhaustion of energy resources, such as oil and gas, is not yet virulent
(Gordon 2005:122-123). Similarly, unlike GRAY (1914) and HOTELLING (1931) more re-
cent contributions to the resource economics literature such as ADELMAN (1990, 1993)
and GORDON (1967) are based on the assumption that the exhaustion of resources does
not bear any binding restriction.
The proposed risk indicator aims at condensing the bulk of empirical information
on the imports of fossil fuels, such as oil, gas, and coal, originating from a multitu-
de of export countries as well as data on the indigenous contribution to the domestic
supply of all kinds of energy sources, including biofuels and other renewable energies.
Our concept’s empirical outcome is a single ﬁgure that characterizes the total risk of a
country’s reliance on fossil fuel imports at a given point of time. While taking account
of all energy sources used in a country, both renewable and non-renewable, the basic
ingredients of our concept are a country’s own contribution to the total domestic sup-
ply of any fuel, the fuels’ import shares, and the probabilities of supply disruptions
in export countries. The conceived risk indicator is essentially a weighted average of
fuel-speciﬁc risks, with the weights being the relative contribution of a fuel to the over-
all energy supply in a country, including domestically produced fossil fuels as well as
biofuels and renewable electricity and heat generation. Most importantly, the indicator
is able to take account of the fact that an export country’s oil supply disruption may
be correlated with those of other fossil fuels. The Iran, for example, is among the most
important oil and gas producing countries, implying serious oil as well as gas supply
shortages in case of potential political conﬂicts.
The following section elaborates on a statistical indicator of energy security. In
Section 3, the proposed concept is applied to empirical energy data on Germany and
the U. S (1980-2004), which is provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA). The
results indicate that the current supply situation is much more relaxed for the U. S. than
for Germany. The last section summarizes and concludes.
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Designating the share of export country j in the domestic supply of energy resource i
by xij and the respective indigenous contribution by xid,i ti s :
xid + xi1 + ... + xij + ... + xiJ =1 ,i =1 ,...,I. (1)
Denoting the probability of supply disruptions in export country j by rj, we suggest




i · R · xi = x
2





ij · rj. (2)
The risk-characterizing matrix R is deﬁned by R := rT ·I, where I is the identity matrix
and rT := (rd,r 1,...,rj,...,rJ) may be denoted as risk vector. Essentially, the probability
of a disruption of a nation’s own contribution to the domestic supply can be assumed
to equal zero: rd =0 .
From the perspective of an import country, the components of share vector xi
deﬁned by xT
i := (xid,x i1,...,xij,...,xiJ), are the primary instruments to improve supply
security. If xid equals unity, a nation is autarkic with respect to fuel i. In this polar case,
the supply risk related to fuel i, as deﬁned by (2), takes on the minimum value of zero,
indicating a perfectly secure fuel supply. In the opposite polar case, in which the total
supply of fuel i exclusively originates from highly instable export countries such that
rj =1for all countries j =1 ,...,J, riski takes on the maximum value of unity. In short,
the fuel-speciﬁc risk deﬁned by (2) is normalized: 0 ≤ riski ≤ 1 (for a proof of this
proposition, see Appendix A).
Deﬁning the fuel-speciﬁc risk via a quadratic form implies that the risk contribu-
tion of an export country j that provides for only a small fraction of, say, xij =3%o f
the domestic supply is rather negligible. The weight x2
ij of such a country in expression
(2) is as low as .0009. This seems to be sensible, as in practice export countries with
such a small contribution to the domestic supply should be quite irrelevant for a nati-
on’s energy security situation. Furthermore, increasing diversiﬁcation by splitting up
the imports originating from a single country so that the same amount is then imported
from several countries with the same risk characterization reduces the supply risk.
6Deﬁnition (2) thus comprises three major aspects of energy security: (1) a coun-
try’s own contribution xid to the total domestic supply of fuel i (2) the political and
economic stability of export countries as captured by risk vector r, and (3) the diversiﬁ-
cation of imports as reﬂected by vector xi. The aspect of diversiﬁcation is incorporated
in the fuel-speciﬁc indicator riski in that it builds on HERFINDAHL’s (1950) index with
which one can measure the concentration of fuel imports1:
Hi := s
2
i1 + ... + s
2
ij + ... + s
2
iJ, (3)
where sij denotes the share of export country j in total imports of fuel i. The share sij
relates to country j’s contribution xij to the total domestic supply of fuel i as follows:
xij = sij(1 − xid). (4)
According to this expression, increasing the indigenous contribution xid decreases xij,
thereby alleviating the import dependency with respect to fuel i and, hence, riski.
If R is deﬁned by R := rT · I, a tacit assumption underlying risk deﬁnition (2)
is that supply disruptions are uncorrelated among export countries, implying that the
existence of the OPEC is ignored. To take account of cartels of export countries, the risk
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where the cartel discipline is characterized in this matrix by a common disruption pro-
bability rc. The block emerging in this matrix reﬂects the correlation of supply disrupti-
ons among cartel member countries. In effect, this amendment amounts to treating all
1An alternative to the HERFINDAHL’s index for measuring diversiﬁcation is a measure proposed by
SHANNON (1948): Si =
 
j sij · lnsij. We have deliberately refrained from basing our risk indicator on
SHANNON’s measure, as such an indicator cannot be normalized. The reason is that the maximum of Si
is given by lnJ and increases with the number J of export countries.
7cartel members as a single country, whose share is the sum of the members’ individual
contributions xij. In principle, therefore, the case of supply disruptions in which sever-
al export countries are involved at the same time bears no fundamental difﬁculty and
does not corrupt deﬁnition (2).
Thus far, we have focused on a single fuel i, whose supply situation is charac-
terized by riski. To measure a nation’s entire vulnerability with respect to all kinds of
energy imports, we suggest evaluating the following generalization of the fuel-speciﬁc
supply risk deﬁned by (2):
risk := w
T · X
T · R · X · w = w
T · Π
T · w. (6)
wT := (w1,...,wi,...,wI) represents a vector whose non-negative components wi reﬂect
the shares of the various fuels and energy sources in a nation’s total energy consump-
tion and, hence, add to unity: w1 + ... + wI =1 . The columns of matrix X comprise the
indigenous as well as the export country’s contributions to the domestic supply of each
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The diagonal elements πii of the product matrix Π := XT ·R·X are identical to the fuel-
speciﬁc supply risks: πii = riski =
 J
j x2
ijrj ≥ 0. Non-vanishing off-diagonal elements,
πkl =
 J
j xkjxljrj > 0 for k,l =1 ,...,I,k  = l, take account of the fact that, for instance,
oil supply disruptions in an export country may be correlated with those of gas. It
bears noting that the total supply risk (6) is normalized, as is intuitive and proven in
Appendix A: 0 ≤ risk ≤ 1.
83 Empirical Application
Based on energy data provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA), we now
employ both the fuel-speciﬁc as well as the overall supply risk indicators to compare
Germany’s and the U. S. inter-temporal changes in the energy supply risk during the
period 1980 through 2004. The selection of this period, being due to data availability,
allows us to examine both country’s reactions to the oil price crises of the 1970s, where
the ﬁrst can be traced to the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, while the second was the result
of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent ﬁrst Gulf war between Iran and
Iraq in 1980. The probabilities rj of supply disruptions in individual export countries
are identiﬁed here by the OECD classiﬁcations displayed in Table B1 of Appendix B.
These country-speciﬁc classiﬁcations, which have been slightly modiﬁed to lie within
the range of zero to unity, are commonly used to gauge loan loss risks, but also to
characterize a country’s political and economic situation2.
Starting with oil, the still most important fossil fuel both in Germany and the
U. S.(Table 1), weﬁnd thatboth country’s supplyrisk hasroughlydoubled –in terms of
our fuel-speciﬁc indicator – between 1980 and 2004, implying a substantially increasing
gap (see Figure 1). A major reason for this ﬁnding is that Germany’s reliance on Rus-
sian oil has risen dramatically since the end of the 1970s. At present, Russia is, by far,
Germany’s most important oil provider, being responsible for as much as about 40% of
total oil supply (see Table B2). That Germany suffers much more from today’s tensed
oil supply situation than the U. S. is due to the fact that the substantial decline in the
U. S. oil production to only a third of the domestic supply has been almost outweighed
by intensiﬁed imports from stable countries such as Canada and Mexico (see Table B3).
A pattern similar to that for oil can be observed for both country’s natural gas
supply risks (see Figure 2). While the moderate reduction of the indigenous share in the
U. S. gas supply has been balanced by extending the imports from Canada, in the end
stabilizing the U. S. gas supply risk at the negligible level of the 1980s, the drastic decli-
2These classiﬁcations are assumed here to be inter-temporally constant, an assumption that should
not be consequential, as the classiﬁcation of an individual country hardly changes over time.
9ne of Germany’s relative contribution to its domestic gas supply has been encountered
by surging gas imports from Russia. Currently, the contribution of Russian pipelines
to Germany’s gas supply amounts to about 35% (see Table B4) and, hence, is almost as
high as Russia’s oil supply share. By contrast, Russian gas played only a minor role for
Germany in the 1970s. These fundamental changes and Russia’s dominance in both the
German oil and gas procurement are all the more disconcerting as the signiﬁcance of
gas has substantially risen: The share of gas in Germany’s primary energy supply mix
increased from 14.2% in 1980 to 22.6% in 2004 (Table 1).
Figure 1: Crude Oil Supply Risks in Germany and the U. S. (1980-2004)
In contrast to gas, whose consumption as well as imports have been growing sin-
ce the 1970s, Germany’s abundantly available brown coal has lost relative signiﬁcance.
Its share in the primary energy supply mix shrank from 21.7% in 1980 to only 11.9% in
2004 (Table 1). Another domestic energy source, the German hard coal, experienced a
decline due to the widening gap between domestic production cost and world market
prices of coal (FRONDEL,K AMBECK,S CHMIDT 2007). Yet, despite its increasing econo-
mic disadvantages, the indigenous contribution to the hard coal supply in Germany
only decreased from about 85% in 1980 to some 40% today (Table B4). By contrast, re-
newable energy technologies such as wind, solar, and hydro power are still of minor
importance for supply security, although these technologies receive strong ﬁnancial
10support in Germany.
Figure 2: Natural Gas Supply Risks in Germany and the U. S.
Table 1: Primary Energy Supply Mix in % in Germany and the U. S.
U. S. Germany
1980 1990 2000 2004 1980 1990 2000 2004
Oil 44.4 40.0 38.7 40.7 40.8 35.5 38.3 35.9
Hard Coal 20.0 22.5 22.6 22.5 17.5 15.5 13.4 12.7
Gas 26.3 22.8 23.8 22.1 14.2 15.4 20.9 22.6
Nuclear 3.8 8.3 9.0 9.1 4.0 11.2 12.9 12.5
Brown Coal 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 21.7 20.6 11.3 11.9
Hydro 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
Other sources 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.6 1.3 1.4 2.7 3.9
Note: Calculations are based on IEA (2006c, 2004d, 2006d). Other sources include solar, tide, wind power, etc.
While this also holds true for the U. S. , there is hardly any reliance on foreign hard
coal, aside from oil and gas the most important fuel (Table 1). In short, with the increase
in nuclear power, which has partially compensated the declining share of domestic oil
in the U. S. primary energy supply since the 1980s, and a very low dependence on
gas and hard coal imports from instable countries, the U. S. energy security situation
appears to be much better than in Germany. This qualitative conclusion is substantiated
11by the calculation of the total supply risk indicator, whose inter-temporal changes are
displayed in Table 2.
In terms of our risk indicator (6), Germany’s energy supply risk is about seven
times higher than the U. S. risk. While it roughly doubled between 1980 and 2004 in the
U. S., above all due to the doubling of the oil-speciﬁc supply risk in this period, it more
than doubled in Germany. In addition to the increase in the oil-speciﬁc supply risk, the
reason is the growing dependency from hard coal and, most notably, gas imports.
Table 2: Total Energy Supply Risks in Germany and the U. S.
1980 1990 2000 2004
Germany 100.0 101.0 173.5 230.1
U. S. 16.2 15.6 27.2 33.8
Note: All values refer to the situation in Germany in 1980.
The inter-temporal picture appears to be somewhat different if the OPEC cartel
is taken into account in calculating total supply risks (Table 3) and all OPEC members
are uniformly characterized as highly instable countries, building a single block of oil
exporters. Attributing the maximum risk of rc =1to all OPEC members indicates that
Germany heavily relied on OPEC oil in 1980, but as well as the U. S. has reduced this
dependency substantially in the aftermath of the oil crises. Since 1990, however, the
U. S. energy risk has again increased, because the relative signiﬁcance of the U. S. oil
productions has shrunk dramatically (Table B3). In contrast, the energy risk remained
quite stable in Germany between 1990 and 2004, most notably because the OPEC’s oil
supply share decreased from about 40% to slightly less than 20%, whereas Germany’s
reliance on Russian oil imports has almost doubled, to some 40% in 2004 (Table B2).
Table 3: Total Energy Supply Risks in case of a Strict OPEC Cartel Discipline
1980 1990 2000 2004
Germany 100.0 41.2 40.7 41.9
U. S. 25.3 17.2 24.4 30.2
Note: All values refer to the situation in Germany in 1980.
12The calculations presented in both Tables 2 and 3 are based on the grounds that
nuclear fuels are treated here as a domestic fuel, as well as renewable energy sources.
The explanation for this setting is that, in practice, nuclear fuels are frequently imported
in times when prices are low and stored up to several decades before used in nuclear
power plants.
4 Summary and Conclusion
In recent decades, numerous developing countries, most notably China, experienced a
strong economic growth, requiring more and more mineral and energy resources. As a
consequence, industrialized countries are increasingly struggling to ensure the security
of their energy and resource requirements, leading in the U. S. to a strong support for
domestically produced bio-fuels. Yet, more than 30 years after the OPEC oil embargo in
1973, energy supply security still remains a diffuse concept. This paper has conceived a
statistical risk indicator that includes four major aspects of long-term supply security:
(1) diversiﬁcation of sources in energy supply, (2) diversiﬁcation of fuel imports, (3)
long-term political and economic stability of export countries, and (4) a country’s own
contribution to the domestic energy supply.
Applying the proposed concept to empirical energy data on Germany and the
U. S. (1980-2004), we basically ﬁnd that there is a large gap in the energy supply risk
between both countries, with Germany suffering much more from the tensed energy
supply situation today than the U. S. This gap is likely to rise much further within
the next decades: Given the nuclear phase-out decision of 2000, which demands the
end of nuclear power in Germany at around 2022, and the foreseen dismantling of the
notoriously uneconomic German hard coal production by 2018, the energy supply risk
can be expected to rise even if the national goals of a 20% share of bio-fuels and a
30% share of electricity production from renewable energies will be reached in 2020. A
major reason is that, based on the present share of about 14%, the required increase in
“green” electricity production is much lower than the contribution of nuclear power,
which currently amounts to almost 30%.
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is normalized: 0 ≤ riski ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition I: The fuel-speciﬁc riski is non-negative because it is a sum of non-
negative risk elements ri multiplied by squared, and thus also non-negative, weights
xij. That riski is lower or equal than unity follows from rj ≤ 1, x2
ij ≤ xij for 0 ≤ xij ≤ 1,
















xij + xid =1 .
Proposition II: The total supply risk, risk = wT · Π · w, is normalized:
0 ≤ risk ≤ 1,
where wT := (w1,...,wi,...,wI) and w1 + ... + wI =1 . Π’s diagonal elements πii equal
the fuel-speciﬁc risks, πii = riski =
 
j x2
ijrj, while the off-diagonal elements are given
by πkl =
 J
j xkjxljrj,k = l.
Proof of Proposition II: Similar to the fuel-speciﬁc risk, πii = riski, it is ﬁrst shown
that 0 ≤ πkl ≤ 1 for k  = l: As a sum of products of exclusively non-negative factors,
it is evident that πkl is non-negative. Furthermore, πkl does not exceed unity, as rj ≤ 1,













xkj + xkd =1 .
Second, based on 0 ≤ πkl ≤ 1 for all k,l =1 ,...,I, it follows from w1 + ... + wI =1that
risk = w


















Table B1: Normalized OECD Risk Indicators.
Country Risk Country Risk
Algeria 3/7 Netherlands 0
Angola 6/7 Nigeria 6/7
Canada 0 Norway 0
China 2/7 Poland 2/7
Colombia 4/7 Russia 3/7
Ecuador 1 Saudi-Arabia 2/7
Germany 0 South Africa 3/7
Iran 6/7 U.S. 0
Iraq 1 United Arab Emirates 2/7
Kuwait 2/7 United Kingdom 0
Libya 1 Venezuela 6/7
Mexico 2/7 Others 1
Source: OECD (2008).
Table B2: Crude Oil Supply Shares in % in Germany.
Origin 1980 1990 2000 2004
Algeria 5.2 3.8 6.1 2.5
Germany 3.8 4.0 3.0 3.0
Iraq 2.8 0.2 0.2 0.0
Iran 4.8 3.1 0.8 0.4
Libya 12.2 12.5 11.1 11.3
Nigeria 8.8 6.7 1.9 0.8
Norway 2.4 7.2 17.5 19.2
Russia 18.7 23.2 32.0 40.7
Saudi-Arabia 19.8 6.5 4.3 3.7
United Emirates 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom 11.8 16.2 12.2 11.4
Venezuela 1.3 5.0 1.8 0.7
Others 3.3 10.8 9.1 6.3
OPEC 60.8 39.3 26.7 19.4
Note: Calculations are based on IEA (2004a, 2006a).
15Table B3: Crude Oil Supply Shares in % in the U. S.
Origin 1980 1990 2000 2004
Algeria 3.1 0.4 0.0 1.2
Angola 0.0 1.8 2.1 2.0
Canada 1.5 4.8 8.9 10.2
Ecuador 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.5
Iraq 0.3 3.8 4.2 4.1
Kuwait 0.2 0.6 1.7 1.5
Mexico 3.8 5.4 8.7 10.1
Nigeria 6.0 5.7 6.1 6.8
Saudi-Arabia 9.1 9.0 10.1 9.3
United Kingdom 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.5
U. S. 59.8 53.6 37.3 33.2
Venezuela 1.4 5.5 9.9 10.5
Others 13.4 7.5 8.4 8.1
OPEC 29.2 26.4 32.3 33.8
Note: Calculations are based on IEA (2004a, 2006a).
Table B4: Natural Gas Supply Shares in % in Germany and the U. S.
Origin 1980 1990 2000 2004
U. S.
Canada 3.9 7.5 15.5 16.4
U. S. 95.2 92.1 83.4 80.7
Others 0.9 0.4 1.0 3.0
Germany
Germany 32.2 25.8 22.5 18.6
Netherlands 33.6 26.8 19.3 20.3
Norway 12.2 11.1 18.8 22.7
Russia 21.9 35.7 35.4 35.3
Others 0.1 0.6 4.0 3.1
Note: Calculations are based on IEA (2004b, 2006b).
16Table B5: Hard Coal Supply Shares in % in Germany and the U. S.
Origin 1980 1990 2000 2004
U. S.
Colombia 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.6
U. S. 99.8 99.7 98.7 97.3
Others 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0
Germany
Australia 0.5 1.3 5.7 5.8
China 0.2 0.0 0.1 2.7
Colombia 0.0 0.1 4.2 5.4
Germany 85.4 84.9 57.2 42.4
Poland 1.7 3.0 10.4 10.9
Russia 0.2 0.4 1.4 8.5
South Africa 1.3 5.0 7.0 13.5
U. S. 2.0 0.8 1.1 1.4
Others 8.7 4.5 12.9 9.4
Note: Calculations are based on IEA (2004c, 2006c).
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